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THE POISON PILL IN JAPAN: THE MISSING 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Ronald J. Gilson* 
January, 2004 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been anticipated, and 
anticipated, and anticipated.  Each report of a reduction in the size of 
crossholdings among Japanese companies and in the size of Japanese 
bank stockholdings in their clients has given rise to an expectation that 
now, at last, hostile offers would emerge.  It is not surprising that 
commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival of a 
potentially disruptive takeover technique.  The extended Japanese 
recession, together with management resistance to internally 
implemented restructurings and the barriers to externally imposed 
restructurings, has created the potential for substantial private and 
social gain from rationalizing production.  Curtis Milhaupt reports that 
as of 2000, thirteen percent of the Tokyo Stock Exchange non-
financial firms traded at below their liquidation value,1 a phenomenon 
that in the United States led to a wave of bust-up hostile takeovers 
during the 1980s.2  Nonetheless, in Japan the much anticipated hostile 
takeovers did not materialize.  In turn, the absence of takeovers 
resulted in little clamor for defensive tactics: without a threat on the 
horizon, no demand for protection developed. 
A number of events now suggest that the long wait for hostile 
transactions in Japan may be approaching its end.  First, Japanese 
 
* Marc & Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and 
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School.  This article 
was originally delivered as a lecture in the Symposium on Hostile M&A and the 
Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and Policy, sponsored by the Columbia Law School 
Center for Japanese Legal Studies and the firm of Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto, and 
retains some of the informality of that format.  I note in particular my gratitude to 
Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto for their hospitality during my visit to Japan for this 
Symposium, and to Hideki Kanda, Satoshi Kawai and Curtis Milhaupt for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 Curtis J. Mihaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance 
Reform?: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
JAPAN: WHY IT HAPPENS, WHY IT DOESN’T (Magnus Blomstrom & Sumner La Croix 
eds., forthcoming 2004). 
2 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ch.9.E (2d ed. 1995); Ronald J. Gilson, The Political 
Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate 
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).   
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corporate law has been extensively amended since the early 1990s to 
make the structure of corporate governance more flexible and to 
enhance the potential for meaningful monitoring of management.  For 
example, merger procedures have been simplified; a system for 
employee stock option compensation has been established; the 
creation of a holding company system through spinoffs has been 
legalized and facilitated; companies have been given the option of 
adopting a U.S. style board committee-based governance system as an 
alternative to the traditional statutory auditor system; and filing fees 
for derivative litigation have been reduced, resulting in a ten-fold 
increase in derivative litigation.3 
Second, a small amount of hostile activity has actually occurred.  
In 2000 and 2002, M&A Consulting, a Japanese takeover firm, 
initiated control contests directed at Japanese firms: in 2000 a hostile 
bid for Shoei Corporation, a real estate and electronic parts company, 
and in 2002 a proxy fight over dividend policy at Tokyo Style.4  Both 
failed, “in large part because banks and institutional investors gave 
unconditional support to existing management when the unwelcome 
bidder appeared,”5 just as they have in the past.  Other efforts, but now 
by foreign bidders, have proven more successful.  In 2000, the 
management of International Digital Communications (“IDC”), a 
midsized Japanese telephone company, accepted a stock swap with 
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corp.  Britain’s Cable & Wireless 
then made an uninvited competing bid offering slightly more cash 
than the value of the Nippon stock that IDC shareholders would 
receive under the transaction IDC management favored.  IDC 
shareholders voted to accept the uninvited Cable & Wireless bid.6  
Also in 2000, Boehringer Ingelheim, a German pharmaceutical 
company made an unsolicited offer for the Japanese SS 
 
3 Curtis Milhaupt details the pace and scope of corporate law reform.  See 
Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, 
Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity through Deals, in GLOBAL 
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW 
ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) 
4 See Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1. 
5 Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1. 




Pharmaceuticals (“SSP”).  Boehringer succeeded in increasing its SSP 
holdings from approximately twenty percent to thirty-six percent, 
which amounted to a blocking position, and thereby gave the German 
company effective control.7 
Third, informed observers, whose professional practices depend 
upon that status, are now sending a clear signal.  They seem to be 
acting, rather than simply talking, as if these events actually herald the 
coming of Japanese hostile takeovers. Professor Milhaupt reports that 
“many investment banks are no longer discouraging foreign clients 
from hostile bids, and large numbers of Japanese managers are 
seeking professional advice on defensive matters.”8  Of course, supply 
typically follows demand, and law firms now trumpet the belief that 
changes in the Commercial Code make poison pills possible in Japan.9 
It is this last point—the coming of the poison pill to Japan—on 
which I focus on here.  I have expressed the view that the broad 
sanction of the poison pill in the United States has been a mistake.10  
The opposing view, effectively championed by Martin Lipton, the 
poison pill’s architect, is that the pill ultimately did not discourage 
hostile takeovers because courts came to play a mediating role that 
gave target boards the ability to secure a better price but in the end did 
not often lead boards to finally block an offer.11  While I will take up 
 
7 Id.; see Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1, at 11. 
8 Milhaupt & West, Institutional Change, supra note 3, at 322. 
9 It is beyond my ambitions here to track the critical Commercial Code changes 
that appear to validate a poison pill and the alternative forms that a Japanese poison 
pill might take.  I note only that the fact that Japanese poison pills would differ 
formally from their U.S. progenitor, demonstrates the importance of functional as 
opposed to formal convergence of corporate governance practices.  See Ronald J. 
Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).  For assessments of the pill structures allowed by the 
Commercial Code changes, see Satoshi Kawai, Poison Pill in Japan, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. , this issue, Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison Pill Comes to Japan–Part 1, 
THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, March 2002, at 1, and Arthur M. Mitchell, 
The Poison Pill Comes to Japan–Part II, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, 
April 2002, at 1. 
10 For recent expressions, see Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe’s Apologia for 
Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002). 
11 See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to 
Professor Gilson, 27 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls and Professors 
Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002). 
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the claim that experience has rendered the pill benign in the United 
States,12 the stakes are much higher in Japan than they were in the 
United States.  The combination of crossholdings, bank holdings and 
governmental stasis that has frozen Japanese corporate governance 
leaves hostile takeovers as one of the few external mechanisms for 
systemic change that existing institutions do not block or at least 
greatly impede.  Most important, the institutional infrastructure that 
ultimately reduced the defensive impact of the poison pill in the 
United States does not now exist in Japan.  Thus, the poison pill has 
the potential to be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it has been in 
the United States, both because of the absence of ameliorating 
institutions in Japan, and because the impact is likely to be greater 
because in Japan the forces for change in industrial organization 
outside the market for corporate control are significantly less strong 
than in the U.S.13 
My assessment of the coming of the poison pill in Japan proceeds 
as follows.  Part II lays the groundwork for the analysis by putting 
hostile takeovers, a quintessentially U.S. phenomenon, in an 
international and functional context.  Part III takes up the general 
problem posed by defensive tactics and Part IV considers which 
participants in the corporate governance structure police the operation 
of the poison pill in the U.S.  Part V then evaluates the implications of 
the U.S. experience for the development of the poison pill in Japan.  
Part VI concludes. 
II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL AND 
FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT 
While the 1980s hostile takeover wave in the United States was 
viewed with horror outside the U.S. and U.K., international attitudes 
toward hostile takeovers have changed markedly in recent years.  The 
change is most apparent in Europe.  At the time when hostile 
takeovers emerged most forcefully in the U.S., the European attitude 
toward takeovers was extremely negative.  In 1988, the CEO of 
Deutsche Bank offered a German view: hostile takeovers were the 
 
12 See infra text accompanying note 46-48. 
13 See Milhaupt & West, Institutional Change, supra note 3, at 308-10. 
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“blunders of American capitalism.”14  The following year, François 
Mitterand, the President of the French Republic, described takeovers 
as “gangsterism and the law of the strongest.”15 
By 2001, European opinion had shifted dramatically.  In June 2001 
the proposed Thirteenth Directive on takeovers that had emerged 
through the conciliation process reflected a central pro-takeover 
theme; following the British City Code on Takeovers,16 the Directive 
prohibited target boards from taking any defensive action that 
interfered with the shareholders ability to accept a hostile offer.17  
Surprisingly, the agreed upon text was defeated in the European 
Parliament by a tie vote, but the overall professional sentiment did not 
seem to change.  Following the Parliament’s deadlock, a “High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts,” whose creation was promised to 
Parliament during the conciliation process to consider a number of 
issues left unresolved in the proposed Directive, was named and its 
charge extended to making a more general statement of what should 
be the Thirteenth Directive’s operative principles.  From the High 
Level Group’s report, a revised directive would be crafted. 
The High Level Group Report is a remarkable document.  First, it 
demonstrates clearly how much the European attitude toward 
takeovers had changed.  The Report’s central concern was not the 
legitimacy of defensive tactics—that matter had been resolved in favor 
of shareholder choice.18  Rather, the focus is on the structural barriers 
 
14 Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate 
Control, 43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (1990), citing FRANKFURTER ALLEGMEINE  ZEITUNG, 
Dec. 23, 1988. 
15 Id., citing LE MONDE, Feb. 14, 1989 
16 The full text of the City Code is available at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk. 
17 Proposed Thirteenth Directive 0n Company Law, Article 9, COM Doc. (95) 
655 2.7.1996, OJC16/25, revised in COM Doc (97) 565 2.7.1996, OJ 378/10.  This 
proposal was ultimately rejected by the European Parliament.  The current proopsal, 
which maintains this position, was proopsed in February 2002.  Doc.COM (2002) 
534, 2.10.2002.   
18 The Report affirmed the principle of shareholder choice: target shareholder 
approval was required before the target could take “any action which may result in the 
frustration of the bid . . . notably before the issuance of shares which may result in a 
lasting impediment to the offeror obtaining control.”  Indeed, the Report would not 
credit shareholder approval of the creation of a poison pill unless it came after the 
hostile takeover offer occurred.  Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids in the European 
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to takeovers in individual countries that prevent a level playing field 
within Europe for hostile takeovers.  Companies organized in 
countries without a tradition of protective governance structures such 
as dual class common stock, voting caps, or the right of special classes 
of shareholders to name the directors, are at a substantial 
disadvantage.  Companies organized in countries with protective 
structures can make hostile offers for companies organized in 
countries without them, but would be protected against hostile offers 
directed at them. 
The High Level Group Report responds to the level playing field 
problem by proposing a “break through principle” that invalidates 
barriers to the exercise of voting control by the holder of a majority of 
the equity interests after a bidder acquires 75 percent of the equity of 
the target company (regardless of voting power), in effect limiting 
multiple voting rights to two to one.19  Note that the High Level 
Report is dramatically more protakeover than the most favorable 
reading of U.S. takeover law, which would leave in place structural 
control devices that either predate a public offering or were approved 
by shareholders.  Thus, at least professional opinion and the opinion of 
the European Commission, had come a long way since 1988. 
So what changed?  The key is understanding that corporate 
acquisitions function as an equilibrating mechanism.  From this 
perspective, acquisitions are an important mechanism for economic 
change and hold out the promise of facilitating the particular 
economic change of greatest interest to the European Market—the 
creation of a single market. 
To see this, think of a simple two period model.20  In period one, 
the economy is in organizational equilibrium.  All assets are owned by 
the entity that can most effectively use them, conditional on existing 
organizational and industrial technology, on the politically dictated 
regulatory regime, and on the transaction costs of shifting the use of 
the assets either by moving them between entities or altering their use 
 
Union (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315322 [hereinafter HIGH 
LEVEL GROUP REPORT].  In the U.S., of course, a poison pill can be created before any 
offer is made and without shareholder approval.  See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 
500 A.2d 1346 (Del.1985). 
19 High Level Group Report, supra note 18. 
20 This discussion draws on Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 2, at 163-64. 
  
 7 
within an entity.  Between periods one and two, a change in 
technology occurs that alters the most efficient distribution of assets.  
For example, the change may be scientific, creating economies of 
scope between two previously unrelated technologies, or it may be 
political, creating economies of scale as a result of a reduction in 
regulatory barriers to cross-border trade, or it may be transactional, 
reducing the cost of transferring assets between corporations by 
creating a new financing vehicle like junk bonds.  Corporate 
acquisitions occur in period two as the market for assets responds to 
the shift in the efficient boundary of the firm.  The idea is simply a 
market response to changes that implicate organizational form. 
From this perspective, the market for corporate control is an 
equilibrating process that reallocates ownership of assets following a 
change in technology to the entity that then values them most highly.  
Hostile takeovers play a special role in this equilibration.  Sometimes 
target management may resist the equilibration process.  Part of the 
problem results from a good faith difference in views.  For example, 
when the destabilizing change is industry wide, it may be particularly 
difficult to recognize its implications from inside the industry.21  But 
part of the problem also results from the fact that even efficient 
change creates dislocation.  Target management is typically replaced, 
target facilities are often closed, and levels of employment may be 
affected.  Hostile takeovers are at best Kaldor-Hicks, rather than 
Pareto efficient, and target management typically will be among the 
losers.  Thus, resistance to equilibration is hardly surprising. 
From this perspective, the change in European attitudes toward 
hostile takeovers is understandable.  The expansion of the internal 
market, together with growing globalization, altered the efficient scale 
in many industries.  Hostile takeovers have the potential to accomplish 
the necessary reallocation of assets without the delay and political 
posturing associated with government action. 
The same potential helps explain the perennial expectation that 
hostile takeovers are about to come to Japan.  Describing the lengthy 
Japanese recession, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that “a 
combination of ineffectual government and feeble corporate-
restructuring efforts snuffed out growth, which has averaged just 1.1% 
 
21 See Randall Mark et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 
AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989). 
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annually in the past 11 years.”22  Thus, an assessment of defensive 
tactics generally, and poison pills in particular, should appropriately 
focus on whether they impede hostile takeovers from invigorating the 
equilibration process in Japan. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
The recent amendments to the Commercial Code that make 
technically possible a poison pill—a device that, whatever its 
particular form, functions to substantially dilute a hostile bidder’s 
holdings if the bidder’s holdings exceed a triggering percentage—only 
frames the question of whether the poison pill will function to prevent 
hostile takeovers from playing an important equilibrating role.  Most 
simply, the amendments do not themselves address the obligations of 
the board when a hostile bid is actually made.  The bidder will 
condition its offer on the target board redeeming the pill to avoid the 
dilution that would result from the offer’s closing.  Can the board 
simply decline to disarm the pill and thereby prevent shareholders 
from ever having the opportunity to accept or reject the bid?  Because 
a poison pill is only the most effective defensive tactic, answering this 
question requires understanding the role of defensive tactics generally. 
Whenever we observe a target firm deploying a defensive tactic, 
one or more of three motives will be present.  First, target 
management may be acting out of self-interest.  Whether motivated by 
keeping their own jobs or by protecting other stakeholders from the 
costs imposed by economic change, target management may try to 
preserve the status quo despite the fact that the shareholders would be 
best served by being allowed to accept the hostile offer. 
Second, target management may be acting as the shareholders’ 
bargaining agent.  In this case, management is using defensive tactics 
to negotiate a higher price from the hostile bidder or to seek out a 
more favorable competitive bid. 
Finally, target management may be using defensive tactics to 
influence the timing of the corporation’s acquisition.  Management 
may genuinely believe that selling the corporation at this time is not in 
the shareholders’ interest and, critically, that shareholders will make 
 
22 Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, After Long Decline, Japan’s Economy is 
Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. 
  
 9 
the wrong decision even if management explains its views.23  While 
the short run effect of defensive tactics undertaken for this reason is 
the same as with defensive tactics undertaken for self-serving 
reasons—the offer is defeated if the defensive tactics are successful—
in this case the motivation is different: the managers believe they are 
acting to maximize shareholder value. 
The fact that defensive tactics may have different motivations 
poses two central questions at the heart of assessing the potential 
impact of the poison pill.  Most important, how is the process policed 
so that defensive tactics motivated by management self-interest are 
never allowed, defensive tactics motivated by an effort to secure the 
best price for shareholders are always allowed,24 and defensive tactics 
motivated by a timing claim are carefully evaluated to prevent claims 
of timing from cloaking self-interested behavior?  The critical 
operational question is the identity of the policeman. 
As I have developed elsewhere,25 the initial debate in the United 
States was driven by two interest groups who advanced diametrically 
opposite views.  Takeover defense lawyers argued that board 
decisions with respect to tender offers should be treated like any other 
board decision concerning an acquisition proposal: the business 
judgment rule should operate to allocate the decision to deploy 
defensive tactics, including whether to adopt or redeem a pill, to the 
target board.26  Academics, in contrast, advanced the view that tender 
offers are themselves an important corporate governance device, 
 
23 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard 
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. 
LAW. 247 (1989) (developing the concept of substantive coercion to cover 
circumstances when shareholders will reject management’s advice even though 
management is right). 
24 While the appropriateness of this behavior seems self-evident now, in early 
years it was the subject of significant debate.  Compare Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking 
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 
(1982), and Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: 
A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982), with Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and  Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1982). 
25 See Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10. 
26 This view was most effectively advanced by Martin Lipton.  For the classic 
formulation, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. 
LAW. 101 (1979). 
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central to acquisitions operating as an equilibrating process.  Efficient 
equilibration requires that shareholders make the ultimate decision 
concerning whether a hostile bid will succeed.27  Interestingly, the two 
sides did agree on one important thing: “courts should not determine 
the outcome of the largest business transactions in history.”28 
In the end, it was the court’s role to decide who would police 
management’s conduct in a hostile takeover.29  Not surprisingly, they 
chose themselves despite the preferences of academics and 
practitioners.  Since 1985, Delaware law has dictated that, in the end, 
the courts would decide whether a board decision not to redeem a 
poison pill would be credited.30  While I have been critical of how the 
Delaware courts, especially the Delaware Supreme Court, have 
implemented the obligation they took on in the face of skepticism 
from both the bar and the academy, the impact of that rather poor 
performance has been more benign than the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s rhetoric might lead one to expect.  Even Martin Lipton, the 
poison pill’s architect and a forceful expositor of the view that the pill 
gives the target the right to “just say no” to a hostile bid, recently 
stated: “[T]he incidence of a target’s actually saying ‘never’ [to a 
hostile bid] is so rare as not to be a real-world problem.”31  As I will 
 
27 See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982). 
28 Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 496. 
29 Chancellor Chandler puts the issue more felicitously: “Corporate law seeks to 
balance the rights of the owners (shareholders) and the duties of management (officers 
and directors).  Much of this balance is achieved by imposing fiduciary duties on 
management while granting only limited rights to shareholder to participate in 
business operations.”  William B. Chandler III, this issue.  Maintaining that balance, 
in this view, is the role of the courts.  I note that this view is not without cost.  
Particularly with respect to takeovers, if the balance point announced by the court is 
not clearly observable to those structuring transactions, then the judicial role becomes 
that of Delphic oracle.  This is not an easy job for judges, and results in, from my 
perspective, the cardinal judicial sin: doctrine that makes transaction planning harder 
rather than easier. 
30 See Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 496-97 (discussing Delaware Supreme 
Court decisions in Household International and Unocal). 
31 Lipton, supra note 11, at 1065. 
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stress in Part III.C., I believe Lipton’s assessment understates the 
poison pill’s continuing impact; however, I agree that the result has 
been better than one could have feared.  Thus, assessing the impact of 
the Commercial Code amendments that now make the pill possible in 
Japan requires understanding the infrastructure in the United States 
that prevented the pill from operating according to its formal terms.  
On its face the pill authorizes the board to invoke a poison pill to 
block a hostile takeover and thus to create a serious barrier to the 
operation of the market for corporate control.  Something outside the 
pill itself—and therefore outside the Commercial Code amendments—
prevented the pill from achieving its destructive potential. 
IV. WHO POLICES THE PILL IN THE U.S.? 
As we have seen, three different institutions—independent 
directors, shareholders, and the courts—have the capacity to police the 
actual operation of the poison pill to prevent it from being used to 
preserve management’s position, and to assess management’s good 
faith belief about the right time to sell the company.  A critical feature 
of the infrastructure that constrained the operation of the poison pill in 
the United States is that all three institutions performed that function. 
A.  Independent Directors 
Independent directors are the first barrier to the use of a poison pill 
to block, as opposed to negotiate, a hostile takeover bid.  Three 
changes over the years since the Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned 
the poison pill32 have catalyzed the role of independent directors as a 
constraint on management self-interest in responding to a hostile 
takeover bid. 
First, independent directors increased in both number and degree 
of independence.  Long before Sarbanes-Oxley and the new stock 
exchange rules on independence, most large U.S. public corporations 
had a majority of outside, non-employee directors.  At the same time, 
outside directors came to be more independent.  Directors who did 
business with the corporation as supplier or professional adviser gave 
way to directors who had no financial ties to the corporation. 
 
32 Moran v. Household Int’l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
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Second, the Delaware courts articulated a clear normative 
statement about the role that independent directors should play in 
evaluating a hostile takeover bid.  Independent directors, the courts 
stated pointedly, are not merely advisors to management with no stake 
in the outcome when confronted with a hostile bid.  In the takeover 
area, courts came to expect independent directors to be the real 
decision makers and “to be the controlling parties in a target 
company’s conduct of its defense.  Only when the directors appear to 
have abdicated their role to management —think of Van Gorkom, 
Macmillan, and QVC—will the court intervene.”33 
Finally, public opinion and the opinions of independent directors 
changed concerning hostile takeovers themselves. As the gains that 
result from hostile takeover driven restructuring became widely 
understood, the structure of executive compensation changed in a 
fashion that reduced management resistance to takeovers.  So long as 
management compensation had a relatively small equity component, 
entrenchment was a value maximizing strategy for management—a 
hostile takeover that benefited shareholders by paying them a 
premium for their shares did not benefit managers, who lost their jobs.  
During the period in which hostile takeovers became a fixture of the 
U.S. corporate landscape, the portion of managerial compensation that 
was equity based increased markedly.  From 1980 to 1994, equity-
based compensation as a percentage of total CEO compensation 
increased from twenty percent to almost fifty percent.34  The shift to 
equity-based compensation accelerated in the 1994 to 2001 period, 
with option-based compensation more than doubling over that 
period.35  The result was to align the incentives of management and 
shareholders with respect to company operations generally, but 
especially respect to takeovers; a premium offer benefited both.36 
 
33 Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 512 (citations omitted). 
34 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like 
Bureaucrats?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998). 
35 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 
33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2002). 
36 While explaining what went wrong with U.S. governance as we approached 
the turn of the century is far beyond my ambitions here, I note that it is textbook 
economics that an increase in the intensity of management incentives requires a 
corresponding increase in the intensity of monitoring of their performance.  See PAUL 
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Thus, independent directors came to understand that they were to 
be the central decision makers in dealing with a hostile offer and to 
recognize that hostile takeovers were part of the proper functioning of 
the capital market rather than an attack on the corporate citadel.  The 
circle was closed by a shift in the form of management compensation 
that reduced the pressure on outside directors by reducing the financial 
threat hostile takeovers posed to management.  As a result, both 
directors and management were less likely to use poison pill as an 
entrenchment device as opposed to a bargaining tool. 
B.  Courts 
The story of the Delaware court’s development of the law of 
hostile takeovers is too long and tortured to be recounted here.37  A 
fair reading of that path provides some support for Martin Lipton’s 
assessment that target boards in the end have not often used the pill to 
block a hostile bid.  Despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
frustratingly fuzzy and inconsistent rhetoric, the chancery court’s 
decisions still fairly suggest that the validity of defensive tactics will 
be independently assessed, even if one cannot avoid the intuition that 
the opinions are rhetorically camouflaged for the benefit of the 
supreme court.  Management justification of efforts to block a hostile 
bid based on a claim that the stock market undervalues the 
corporation’s shares or that shareholders will be confused by the offer 
will typically, but not uniformly, evoke judicial inquiry into the source 
of those problems.  Perhaps most important, the courts have clarified 
one critical premise: the touchstone for decision is shareholder value.  
This does not mean that other stakeholders are unimportant, but only 
that their importance is viewed through the prism of equity value.38  
As Chancellor Chandler points out, this constrains, but does not 
eliminate managerial discretion;39 stakeholder concern can still 
 
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT ch.6 
(1992).  This did not happen. 
37 The early doctrinal history is developed in GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, ch 
15 ; the more recent history is recounted in Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10.  Chancellor 
Chandler’s contribution to this Symposium presents a nuanced account of the story 
from the perspective of the courts.  Chandler, supra note 29. 
38 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
39 Chandler, supra note 29.. 
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surface through management claims of a long run strategy not 
appreciated by the market 
Thus, despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s rhetorical deference 
to director power to deploy defensive tactics, the chancery court 
continued to make factually rich assessments of whether target boards 
were using the pill to negotiate or to entrench,40 surely emboldened by 
the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has yet, now more than 
fifteen years after validating the poison pill, to directly address 
whether a target board of directors can simply decline to redeem a 
poison pill based on the belief that the company is worth more.  On 
balance, the Delaware courts have constrained the mischief that the 
poison pill could have caused.41 
C.  The Shareholders and the Market 
Independent of legal rules, institutional investors have come to 
impose a market constraint on a target’s ability to use the poison pill 
to block a takeover bid.  The simple fact is that institutions hold a 
large percentage, often a majority, of the stock of publicly traded U.S. 
companies.  While it is commonplace to note the importance of the 
large public pension funds, like the California Public Employees 
Retirement System and TIAA-CREF, large mutual funds also hold 
very large positions.  For example, FMR, the adviser to the Fidelity 
family of mutual funds, alone holds stakes of five percent or more in 
288 of the largest 1000 American public corporation in 2000 and 
2001.42  Although less voca;ly than the public pension funds, large 
mutual funds also have come to oppose the use of poison pills without 
shareholder approval.  Fidelity’s voting policies state: 
If, without shareholder approval, a company’s Board of 
Directors has instituted a new poison pill plan, extended an 
existing plan, or adopted a new plan upon the expiration of an 
 
40 The Chancery Court opinion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 
(2000) is a clear example of this phenomenon. 
41 To be sure, as I have urged elsewhere, it would have been better if the 
Supreme Court had actually played the role it gave itself in Household International, 
but it could have been worse too. 
42 Gerald F. Davis & Mina Yoo, The Shrinking World of the Large US 
Corporation: Common Ownership and Board Ties, 1990-2001 (June 2003). 
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existing plan during the last year, we generally withhold 
votes on the election of directors at the Annual Meeting 
following such action. 
Fidelity may vote in favor of a rights plan with “sunset” 
provisions: if the plan is linked to a business strategy that 
will—in our view—likely result in greater value for 
shareholders, if the term is less than five years, and if 
shareholder approval is required to reinstate the expired plan 
or adopt a new plan at the end of this term. . . . 
We generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that 
shareholders be given the opportunity to vote on the adoption 
of rights plans.43 
Other large fund families, like Vanguard, take similar positions. 
Large shareholder antipathy to a target company’s ability to use a 
poison pill to block a hostile bid favored by shareholders operates to 
very substantially limit target management’s ability to block a hostile 
bid out of self-interest.  For those companies that do not have 
staggered boards, which still includes more than forty percent of U.S. 
public companies,44 a proxy contest to replace directors who decline 
to redeem a poison pill in fact may operate more quickly than a 
judicial challenge to the board’s action even with more shareholder 
oriented judicial review; the process of evaluating alternative 
strategies and seeking alternatives to the bid, allowed under even the 
chancery court’s most pro-stockholder formulation, still allows delay 
that could easily run six or more months.  And even where staggered 
boards are in place, a strategy of disregarding the views of a majority 
 
43 Summary of Proxy Voting Guidelines, http://personal.fidelity.com (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2003).  There is evidence that poison pills are most effective when coupled 
with a staggered board because the board structure prevents an immediate proxy fight 
to replace the board in favor of directors who will redeem the poison pill.  See Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54  STAN. L. REV. 887 
(2002).  Fidelity’s voting policies also dictate votes in favor of proposals to eliminate 
staggered boards. 
44 Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 896. 
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of shareholders, while lawful when stated out of context,45 is hardly 
attractive as a matter of investor relations. 
___________ 
 
In summary, the U.S. experience has been that a poison pill has 
not frequently blocked a hostile bid, once made, from being 
considered by the shareholders.  The pill will give target management 
who oppose the bid time to explain its position, to negotiate with the 
hostile bidder, or to develop an alternative strategy or bidder.  Three 
critical corporate governance institutions—independent directors, the 
Delaware courts, and the capital market—combine to cause the pill to 
operate largely as a negotiating tool, rather than as a means to 
maintain company independence.  Without this institutional 
infrastructure, however, it is a fair assessment that the poison pill 
would have materially interfered with the equilibration process that 
the United States experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Despite this appraisalt of the poison pill’s impact in operation, it is 
important not to overstate just how benign the pill turned out to be.  In 
this respect, two qualifications are especially important.  First, when 
coupled with a staggered board, the pill is an effective defense, and 
the empirical evidence suggests that in this context the pill has 
allowed management in an economically significant number of cases 
to prevent shareholders from making a decision about whether to 
accept a hostile bid.46  Second, we simply do not know whether courts 
now would allow a target corporation to decline to redeem a poison 
pill in the face of the kind of offer that played a significant role in the 
1980s equilibration process: a junk bond financed bust-up offer made 
by takeover entrepreneurs whose strategy is to sell the parts of the 
company to more efficient users of the target’s assets.  Because such a 
bid contemplates a major change in corporate strategy, may involve 
forms of payment that are more difficult to value, and may be made by 
individuals who are not part of the business mainstream, it is difficult 
for the courts, and I expect for the target directors, to sort out 
 
45 See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Board not required to redeem a poison pill even though 
eighty-eight percent of the target shareholders have tendered their shares). 
46 Bebchuk et al., supra note 43. 
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management’s actual motive for resisting the offer.  It is in this 
circumstance that a clearer standard—like the chancery court’s 
position before Time-Warner that, after a target board has had the time 
to explain, negotiate and seek out another bidder, the shareholders 
have the chance to accept or reject the bid47—is a better outcome.  
And it is in this circumstance, likely of real economic importance 
because of the need for outsiders to make the kind of changes that are 
difficult for insiders to see and where the transaction functions most 
plainly as an equilibrating mechanism, that the pill may still be a 
serious economic problem.48 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE FOR THE 
POISON PILL IN JAPAN 
The United States experience can provide some guidance for how 
Japan deals with the Commercial Code’s authorization of a poison 
pill.  To be sure, there are important limits on the relevance of the 
American experience to Japan.  Japanese industrial organization and 
Japanese corporate governance differs markedly from that of the 
United States, which surely limits the extent to which the U.S. 
experience is transferable.  Nonetheless, poison pills are a U.S. 
phenomenon, so it is the only source of experience that is available.  
Thus, while remaining attentive to the difficulties of generalizing from 
a single country’s experience in the face of important inter-country 
differences, we have to take guidance from wherever we find it albeit, 
with a grain (or pillar) of salt. 
The first, and most important point is hardly limited to the pill.  
Allowing the capital market to operate as a mechanism to force 
corporations to respond to external environmental change is an 
important macroeconomic factor.  It is especially important when 
other change inducing mechanisms, most notably government, may 
not only be ineffective, but may be affirmative barriers to change.  In 
this setting, the role of institutional infrastructure to cabin the 
operation of the pill somewhere short of its capacity is critical.   
This argument, of course, is not economics, but political economy.  
Mancur Olson famously predicted that interest groups with stakes in 
the current structures of economic organization will act to preserve the 
 
47 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
48 I am grateful to Steve Fraidin for his repeated reminders of this point. 
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status quo and the size of their piece of the pie even if their actions 
actually reduce the overall size of the pie.49  Thus, it may be 
politically naïve to imagine that those who favor the status quo will be 
unable to prevent a reduction in the pill’s effectiveness.  Certainly the 
experience in the United States, especially at the state level, counsels 
that politics played an important role in setting the policy with respect 
to defensive tactics.50 
The second point is that the pill has “worked” in the United 
States—that is, it has been largely but not exclusively used to support 
seeking a better deal for the shareholders rather than simply to block a 
bid—because independent directors, courts, and active institutional 
investors have all combined to police the uses to which the pill 
actually is put.  The next step, then, is to assess what institutions can 
play that ameliorating role in Japan. 
Here the courts win by default.  Traditional Japanese corporate 
governance does not contemplate independent directors of the 
character that has proven so important in the operation of the poison 
pill in the U.S.  And while recent Commercial Code amendments 
allow Japanese corporations to elect a U.S. style governance structure 
with outside directors staffing governance committees, there is reason 
to be skeptical of the impact of the change. First, Japanese corporate 
law does not require an “outside” director to be independent in the 
sense that term is used in the U.S.51 Second, early reports suggest a 
limited response to the invitation to adopt a U.S. governance structure.  
As of mid-June, only thirty-six listed Japanese companies had 
 
49 See MACUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982). 
50 In this respect, it likely has been beneficial that Delaware’s race, whether to 
the top or the bottom, has been with the Federal government, not with other states.  
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); GILSON & 
BLACK, supra note 2, ch.23. 
51 See Japanese Commercial Code art.. 188.  The distinction between 
“outside”  as defined by the commercial Codeand “independent” directors as 
contemplated under U.S. law is discussed in Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate 
Governance, working paper (January 2004). 
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committed to adopting the new governance structure.52  Even for that 
group, the U.S. experience strongly suggests that the effectiveness of 
independent directors depends on a shared vision of their function that 
is both situational and requires time to develop. 
We can thus expect that the burden of assuring the sensible 
operation of the poison pill will fall to the Japanese courts, just as it 
did to the Delaware courts.  And it would be a serious mistake to 
underestimate the weight of that burden.  Because the Commercial 
Code amendments that now allow a poison pill in Japan are technical 
rather than substantive, the Japanese court will be operating without 
legislative guidance.  Thus it will be up to the courts to write, through 
the accretion of judicial decisions, a poison pill “code” that will give 
transaction planners for both bidders and targets guidance concerning 
the operational rules of a Japanese market for corporate control.  This 
was the mantle that the Delaware courts took up more than fifteen 
years ago, and which they have yet to fully discharge; most starkly, 
we still do not know whether a target board, whose reason for 
blocking an offer is simply that the shareholders may disagree with the 
board over the company’s “fundamental value” or the appropriate time 
to sell the company, may block the offer by declining to redeem a 
poison pill.53  If this is the performance of the commercial court with 
the most takeover experience of any in the world, the Japanese courts 
confront a serious challenge. 
When I delivered a precursor to this Article at the Symposium in 
Tokyo, I commented that assigning to Japanese courts the role of 
creating a code, as opposed to applying a legislatively enacted code to 
the cases before them, seemed an oddly common law pattern in a legal 
system whose roots lie in the civil law.  Professor Kanda rightly 
rebukes this reliance on formal differences between legal systems, 
reminding us that the divergence between different common law 
jurisdictions and between different civil law systems may be as large 
as the divergence between the two legal systems.54 
 
52 David Pilling, Japanese Boards Adopt US Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 
1. 
53 Chancellor Chandler nicely explains how the Delaware Supreme Court has 
managed this dance.  Chandler, supra note 29. 
54 Hideki Kanda, Comment, this issue. 
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At the Symposium, I also suggested that the abuse-of-rights 
doctrine, invoked so broadly by the Japanese courts to protect 
expectations of lifetime employment from a statute that as a technical 
matter dictates employment-at-will,55 could be used as a model to 
develop case law that provides a nonstatutory constraint on the use of 
the poison pill to block needed economic change.  Professor Kanda 
again properly corrects my superficial analysis of Japanese law.  My 
attraction to the Japanese courts’ experience with the abuse of rights 
doctrine was simply the court’s creation of a judicial doctrine that 
restricted the operation of a statute that on its face was not restricted, 
the functional task the courts will confront in constraining the 
operation of the poison pill.  Professor Kanda reminds us that what is 
important is not the particular judicial doctrine—on reflection, it 
seems odd for me to have imagined that the Japanese courts would 
import a largely labor law doctrine into company law—but that a 
doctrine be available to serve as a vehicle for the effort.  As he 
suggests, the Commercial Code in sections 280-10 and 280-39(4) 
explicitly invites the necessary doctrinal development by providing 
that “significantly unfair” stock issuances may be set aside.56  
Certainly the term “unfair” is sufficiently empty that it can be filled 
with whatever substance the court concludes is appropriate. 
I offer a final, and now appropriately tentative, speculation 
concerning the development of judicial constraints on the operation of 
the poison pill.  Recently, the Japanese courts have struck down the 
issuance of shares to a bidder favored by target management based on 
an assessment that the issuance’s primary purpose was to protect 
target management.  While the willingness of the courts to strike down 
defensive action is encouraging, I believe analysis of motivation will 
prove insufficient in Japan, just as it did in Delaware,57 to distinguish 
between appropriate and inappropriate defensive tactics. 
 
55 See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 395-98 (Leo 
Kanowitz trans., 1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor 
Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 
525-26 (1999). 
56 Kanda, supra note 53. 
57 See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 27. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Commercial Code amendments that in effect authorize 
Japanese corporations to adopt a poison pill launch a major economy 
on a problematic course made even more difficult because, after some 
dozen years of recession, meaningful economic reform now seems to 
be taking hold.  The market for corporate control holds the promise of 
accelerating that recovery by providing a reform vector that is not 
constrained by governmental rigidities.  The U.S. experience with the 
poison pill provides some guidance for that enterprise.  Of course, that 
guidance will have to be refracted through the prism of Japanese 
institutions to be useful, but even one data point is better than none.  
From the perspective of an interested academic viewing the Japanese 
corporate governance from a distance, it will be fascinating to watch 
the poison pill experience replayed in another system.  For those of us 
who have been critical of how the Delaware courts have dealt with the 
poison pill, having a second data point will be extremely interesting. 
 
